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Abstract—In recent years, Deep Learning(DL) techniques have
been extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly
visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported
to achieve or even surpass the human performance. While many
recent works demonstrated that DL models are vulnerable to ad-
versarial examples. Fortunately, generating adversarial examples
usually requires white-box access to the victim model, and real-
world cloud-based image classification services are more complex
than white-box classifier,the architecture and parameters of DL
models on cloud platforms cannot be obtained by the attacker.
The attacker can only access the APIs opened by cloud platforms.
Thus, keeping models in the cloud can usually give a (false) sense
of security. In this paper, we mainly focus on studying the security
of real-world cloud-based image classification services. Specifi-
cally, (1) We propose a novel attack method, Fast Featuremap
Loss PGD (FFL-PGD) attack based on Substitution model, which
achieves a high bypass rate with a very limited number of
queries. Instead of millions of queries in previous studies, our
method finds the adversarial examples using only two queries
per image; and (2) we make the first attempt to conduct an
extensive empirical study of black-box attacks against real-world
cloud-based classification services. Through evaluations on four
popular cloud platforms including Amazon, Google, Microsoft,
Clarifai, we demonstrate that FFL-PGD attack has a success
rate over 90% among different classification services. (3) We
discuss the possible defenses to address these security challenges
in cloud-based classification services. Our defense technology is
mainly divided into model training stage and image preprocessing
stage.
Index Terms—Cloud Vision API , Cloud-based Image Classi-
fication Service , Deep Learning , Adversarial Examples
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Deep Learning(DL) techniques have been
extensively deployed for computer vision tasks, particularly
visual classification problems, where new algorithms reported
to achieve or even surpass the human performance. Success of
DL algorithms has led to an explosion in demand. To further
broaden and simplify the use of DL algorithms, cloud-based
services offered by Amazon1, Google2, Microsoft3, Clarifai4,
and others to offer various computer vision related services
including image auto-classification, object identification and
illegal image detection. Thus, users and companies can readily
benefit from DL applications without having to train or host
their own models.
1https://aws.amazon.com
2https://cloud.google.com
3https://azure.microsoft.com
4https://www.clarifai.com/
[1] discovered an intriguing properties of DL models in the
context of image classification for the first time. They showed
that despite the state-of-the-art DL models are surprisingly
susceptible to adversarial attacks in the form of small pertur-
bations to images that remain (almost) imperceptible to human
vision system. These perturbations are found by optimizing the
input to maximize the prediction error and the images modified
by these perturbations are called as adversarial example. The
profound implications of these results triggered a wide interest
of researchers in adversarial attacks and their defenses for deep
learning in general.The initially involved computer vision task
is image classification. For that, a variety of attacking methods
have been proposed, such as L-BFGS of [1], FGSM of [2],
PGD of [3],deepfool of [4] ,C&W of [5] and so on.
Fortunately, generating adversarial examples usually re-
quires white-box access to the victim model, and real-world
cloud-based image detection services are more complex than
white-box classification and the architecture and parameters
of DL models on cloud platforms cannot be obtained by the
attacker. The attacker can only access the APIs opened by
cloud platforms [6], [7]. Thus, keeping models in the cloud
can usually give a (false) sense of security. Unfortunately, a
lot of experiments have proved that attackers can successfully
deceive cloud-based DL models without knowing the type,
structure and parameters of the DL models [8], [9].
In general, in terms of applications, research of adversarial
example attacks against cloud vision services can be grouped
into three main categories: query-based attacks, transfer learn-
ing attacks and spatial transformation attacks. Query-based
attacks are typical black-box attacks, attackers do not have
the prior knowledge and get inner information of DL models
through hundreds of thousands of queries to successfully
generate an adversarial example [10]. In [11], thousands of
queries are required for low-resolution images. For high-
resolution images, it still takes tens of thousands of times.
For example, they achieves a 95.5% success rate with a mean
of 104342 queries to the black-box classifier. In a real attack,
the cost of launching so many requests is very high.Transfer
learning attacks are first examined by [1], which study the
transferability between different models trained over the same
dataset. [12] propose novel ensemble-based approaches to
generate adversarial example . Their approaches enable a large
portion of targeted adversarial example to transfer among
multiple models for the first time.However, transfer learning
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attacks have strong limitations, depending on the collection
of enough open source models, but for example, there are
not enough open source models for pornographic and violent
image recognition.Spatial transformation attacks are simple
and effective. [13] found that adding an average of 14.25%
impulse noise is enough to deceive the Googles Cloud Vision
API. [14] found 7 major categories of spatial transformation
attacks to evade explicit content detection while still preserv-
ing their sexual appeal, even though the distortions and noise
introduced are clearly observable to humans. To the best of
our knowledge, no extensive empirical study has yet been
conducted to black-box attacks and defences against real-world
cloud-based image classification services. We summarize our
main contributions as follows:
• We propose a novel attack method, Fast Featuremap
Loss PGD(FFL-PGD) attack based on Substitution model
,which achieves a high bypass rate with a very limited
number of queries. Instead of millions of queries in pre-
vious studies, our method finds the adversarial examples
using only one or twe of queries.
• We make the first attempt to conduct an extensive empir-
ical study of black-box attacks against real-world cloud-
based image classification services. Through evaluations
on four popular cloud platforms including Amazon,
Google, Microsoft, Clarifai, we demonstrate that our
FFL-PGD attack has a success rate almost 90% among
different classification services.
• We discuss the possible defenses to address these security
challenges in cloud-based classification services. Our pro-
tection technology is mainly divided into model training
stage and image preprocessing stage.
II. THREAT MODEL AND CRITERION
A. Threat Model
In this paper, we assume that the attacker can only access the
APIs opened by cloud platforms, and get inner information of
DL models through limited queries to generate an adversarial
example.Without any access to the training data, model, or any
other prior knowledge,is a real black-box attack.
B. Criterion and Evaluation
The same with [15],We choose top-1 misclassification as our
criterion,which means that our attack is successful if the label
with the highest probability generated by the neural networks
differs from the correct label.We assume the original input
is O,the adversarial example is ADV . For an RGB image
(m×n× 3), (x, y, b) is a coordinate of an image for channel
b(0 6 b 6 2) at location (x, y).We use Peak Signal to Noise
Ratio (PSNR) [16] to measure the quality of images.
PSNR = 10log10(MAX
2/MSE) (1)
where MAX = 255, MSE is the mean square error.
MSE =
1
mn ∗ 3 ∗
2∑
b=0
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
||ADV (i, j, b)−O(i, j, b)||2
(2)
Usually, values for the PSNR are considered between 20 and
40 dB, (higher is better) [17].We use structural similarity
(SSIM) index to measure image similarity, the details of how
to compute SSIM can be found in [18].Values for the SSIM
are considered good between 0.5 and 1.0, (higher is better).
III. BLACK-BOX ATTACK ALGORITHMS
A. Problem Definition
A real-world cloud-based image classification service is a
function F (x) = y that accepts an input image x and produces
an output y. F (.) assigns the label C(x) = arg maxi F (x)i to
the input x.
Original input is O, the adversarial example is ADV and 
is the perturbation.
Adversarial example is defined as:
ADV = O +  (3)
We make a black-box untargeted attack against real-world
cloud-based classification services F (x):
C(ADV ) 6= C(O) (4)
We also assume that we are given a suitable loss function
L(θ, x, y),for instance the cross-entropy loss for a neural
network. As usual, θ ∈ Rp is the set of model parameters.
B. Fast Featuremap Loss PGD based on Substitution model
[19] proposed that the attacker can train a substituted
model, which approaches the target model, and then generate
adversarial examples on the substituted model. Their exper-
iments showed that good transferability exists in adversarial
examples.But the attack is not totally black-box. They have
knowledge of the training data and test the attack with the
same distributed data, and they upload the training data
themselves and they know the distribution of training data [19]
[20] [21]. This leads us to propose the following strategy:
1) Substitute Model Training: the attacker queries the ora-
cle with inputs selected by manual annotation to build
a model F ′(x) approximating the oracle model F (x)
decision boundaries.
2) Adversarial Sample Crafting: the attacker uses substitute
network F ′(x) to craft adversarial samples, which are
then misclassified by oracle F (x) due to the transfer-
ability.We propose Fast Featuremap Loss PGD attack to
improve the success rate of transfer attack.
1) Substitute Model Training Algorithm: We observe that a
large number of machine vision tasks utilize feature networks
as their backends. For examples, Faster-RCNN [23] and SSD
[24] use the same VGG-16 [25]. If we destroy the extracted
features from the backend feature network, both of them will
be influenced.
We can choose one of AlexNet [26], VGG [25]and ResNet
[27] which pretrained on ImageNet as our substitute model.
Better top-1 accuracy means stronger feature extraction ca-
pability. As can be seen from Figure 1, ResNet-152 has
Fig. 1. Top1 vs. network. Top-1 validation accuracies for top scoring single-
model architectures [22].
Algorithm 1 - Substitute Model Training: for oracle F , a
substitute architecture F ′, and an initial training set S.
Require: F ′(x) ,S
1: Define architecture F ′(x)
2: //Label the substitute training set with F
3: S ← {(x, F (x)) : x ∈ S}
4: // Train F ′ on S to evaluate parameters θF ′
5: θF
′ ← train(F ′, S)
6: return θF
relatively good top-1 accuracy, so we choose ResNet-152 as
our substitute model. We fix the parameters of the feature layer
and train only the full connection layer of the last layer.
Our Substitute Model Training Algorithm is very simple,
we train substitute model and generate adversarial example
with the same images.
2) Adversarial Sample Crafting Algorithm: Previous work
[28] has shown that one-step or multi-step attack algorithm
such as FGSM and FGSMk, has better robustness in trans-
fer attacks than CW2, which is based on optimization.FGSM
is an attack for an `∞ -bounded adversary and computes an
adversarial example as:
x+ ε sgn (∇xL(θ, x, y)) (5)
A more powerful adversary is the multi-step variant
FGSMk, which is essentially projected gradient descent
(PGD) on the negative loss function [3]:
xt+1 = Πx+S
(
xt + ε sgn (∇xL(θ, x, y))
)
(6)
As usual, loss function L(θ, x, y) is cross-entropy loss for a
neural network. We propose Fast Featuremap Loss PGD attack
which has a novel loss function to improve the success rate
of transfer attack.The loss function L is defined as:
L = class loss+ β ∗ FeatureMaps loss (7)
Where ε and β are the relative importance of each loss
function. Next, we will introduce each component of the loss
function in detail.
Class Loss The core goal of generating adversarial example
is to make the result of classification wrong. The first part
of our loss function is class loss. Assuming that the Logits
output of the classifier can be recorded as Z(x), the output
value corresponding to the classification label i is Zi(x), and
t is the label of normal image. The greater the value of Zi(x),
the greater the confidence that x is recognized as i by the
classifier.
class loss(x) = max(max{Z(x)i : i 6= t} − Z(x)t,−κ).
(8)
κ is a hyperparameter and κ is a positive number, the greater
the κ is, the greater the confidence of the adversarial example
is recognized as κ by the classifier. [5] discussed the per-
formance of various class loss in detail in CW2 algorithm.
We choose the class loss selected in CW2 algorithm. The
empirical value of κ is 200. FeatureMap Loss Only class loss
and distance loss can be used to generate adversarial example,
which is what the L-BFGS algorithm of [1] does. However, as
a black-box attack, we have no knowledge of the parameters
and structure of the attacked model. We can only generate
adversarial example through the known substitute model of
white-box attack, and then attack target model. The success
rate of the attack depends entirely on the similarity between the
substitute model and the attacked model. We introduce Feature
Maps loss, which is the output of the last convolution layer of
the substitute model, representing the highest level of semantic
features of the convolution layer after feature extraction layer
by layer Ln.
We assume the original input is O, the adversarial example
is ADV , and the featuremap loss is:
FeatureMap loss(ADV,O) = ‖Ln(ADV )−Ln(O)‖2 (9)
zeiler2014visualizing visualizes the differences in the features
extracted from each convolution layer. In cat recognition, for
example, Figure 2 ,the first convolution layer mainly recog-
nizes low level features such as edges and lines. In the last
convolution layer, it recognizes high level features such as eyes
and nose. In machine vision tasks, convolution layer is widely
used for automatic feature extraction. And a large number of
models are based on the common VGG, ResNet pre-training
parameters on ImageNet and finetuned the weights on the their
own dataset. We assume that the feature extraction part of
the main stream cloud-based image classification services are
based on common open source models as VGG or others. The
larger the feature Maps loss of the adversarial example and
the original image, the greater the difference in the semantic
level. We define the hyperparameter β. The larger the β, the
better the transferability.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. Datasets and Preprocessing
100 cat images and 100 other animal images are selected
from the ImageNet val set. Because VGG19 and Resnet50
Fig. 2. Illustration of cat recognition, the first convolution layer mainly recognizes low level features such as edges and lines. In the last convolution layer,
it recognizes high level features such as eyes and nose.
both accept input images of size 224 × 224 × 3, every input
image is clipped to the size of 224 × 224 × 3, where 3 is
the number of RGB channels. The RGB value of the image is
between 0 and 255. We use these 100 images of cats as original
images to generate adversarial examples and make a black-
box untargeted attack against real-world cloud-based image
classification services. We choose top-1 misclassification as
our criterion, which means that our attack is successful if the
label with the highest probability generated by the cloud-based
image classification service differs from the correct label ”cat”.
We count the number of top-1 misclassification to calculate the
escape rate.
TABLE I
CORRECT LABEL BY CLOUD APIS
Platforms Cat Images Other Animal Images All Images
Amazon 99/100 98/100 197/200
Google 97/100 100/100 197/200
Microsoft 58/100 98/100 156/200
Clarifai 97/100 98/100 195/200
According to Table I, we can learn that Amazon and Google,
which label 98.5% of all images correctly, have done a better
job than other cloud platforms.
B. Fast Featuremap Loss PGD based on Substitution model
We choose ResNet-152 as our substitute model, fix the pa-
rameters of the feature layer and train only the full connection
layer of the last layer. We launched PGD and FFL-PGD attacks
against our substitute model to generate adversarial examples.
PGD and FFL-PGD share the same hyperparameter of step
size ε ,while the hyperparameter β of FFL-PGD set to 0.1.
The escape rates of PGD and FFL-PGD attacks are shown in
Figure 3(a). From Figure 3(a), we know that the cloud-based
image classification services of Amazon, Google, Microsoft
and Clarifai are vulnerable to PGD and FFL-PGD attacks .
Step size  controls the escape rate. Increasing this parameter
can improve the escape rate.
When  is the same, FFL-PGD has a higher escape rate than
PGD. It can be seen that the FeatureMap Loss which added
to the loss function is beneficial to improve the escape rate,
that is, to improve the robustness of transfer attacks against
different cloud-based image classification services.
From Figure 3(b) , we know that PGD has a higher PSNR
,which is considered as better image quality .But both of
them higher than 20dB when  from 1 to 8, which means
both of them are considered acceptable for image quality.In
addition, we can find that increasing  will lead to image
quality degradation.
From Figure 3(c) , we know that FFL-PGD has a higher
SSIM ,which is considered as better image similarity .
FFL-PGD attack has a success rate over 90% among differ-
ent cloud-based image classification services and is considered
acceptable for image quality and similarity using only two
queries per image.
[12] adopted an ensemble-based model to improve trans-
ferability of attack and successfully attack Clarifai. We used
their methods to attack the same cloud platforms and train
our ensemble-based model with AlexNet, VGG-19, ResNet-
50, ResNet-110 and ResNet-152.
According to Table II, we can learn that increasing the num-
ber of iteration can increase PSNR and SSIM under ensemble-
based model attack, which means better image quality and
similarity .
We can infer that when the number of iterations continues
to increase, the perturbation l2 value of adversarial examples
decreases and the PSNR increases. Although the image quality
can be improved, adversarial examples are over fitting the
model , and the transferability decreases in the face of the
pretreatment of cloud services. In [29], they take advantage
of the weakness of iteration-based white-box attack, and use
the pre-processing steps of random scaling and translation to
defense the adversarial examples.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Effect of Attacks
Our research shows that FFL-PGD attack can reduce the ac-
curacy of mainstream image classification services in varying
degrees. To make matters worse, for any image classification
service, we can find a way that can be almost 90% bypassed.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. In 3(a), we increase step size  from 1 to 8, the figure records the escape rates of PGD and FFL-PGD attacks against cloud-based image classification
services under different . In 3(b), the figure records the PSNR of PGD and FFL-PGD attacks and In 3(c), the figure records the SSIM of PGD and FFL-PGD
attacks.
TABLE II
PSNR AND SSIM OF ENSEMBLE-BASED MODE ATTACK
The number of iteration 10 20 50 100 200
PSNR 26.53 27.13 33.56 37.88 42.49
SSIM 0.60 0.58 0.64 0.70 0.77
B. Defenses
Defense adversarial examples is a huge system engineer-
ing, involving at least two stages: model training and image
preprocessing.
1) Model Training: [2] proposed adversarial training to
improve the robustness of deep learning model. Retraining the
model with new training data may be very helpful. Adversarial
training included adversarial examples in the training stage and
generated adversarial examples in every step of training and
inject them into the training set. On the other hand, we can also
generate adversarial samples offline, the size of adversarial
samples is equal to the original data set, and then retrain the
model. We have developed AdvBox [30]5, which is convenient
for developers to generate adversarial samples quickly.
2) Image Preprocessing: [31] evaluated the effect of JPG
compression on the classification of adversarial images and
their experiments demonstrate that JPG compression can re-
verse small adversarial perturbations. However, if the adversar-
ial perturbations are larger, JPG compression does not reverse
the adversarial perturbation. [28] proposed a randomization-
based mechanism to mitigate adversarial effects and their
experimental results show that adversarial examples rarely
transfer between different randomization patterns, especially
for iterative attacks. In addition, the proposed randomization
layers are compatible to different network structures and ad-
versarial defense methods, which can serve as a basic module
for defense against adversarial examples.
Although all the above efforts can only solve some prob-
lems, chatting is better than nothing.
VI. RELATED WORK
Previous works mainly study the security and privacy in
DL models via white-box mode [1] [2] [3] [4]. In the white-
5https://github.com/advboxes/AdvBox
box model, the attacker can obtain the adversarial examples
quickly and accurately. However, it is difficult for the attacker
to know the inner parameters of models in the real world, so
researchers have launched some black-box attacks on DL mod-
els recently. In general, in terms of applications, research of
adversarial example attacks against cloud vision services can
be grouped into three main categories: query-based attacks,
transfer learning attacks and spatial transformation attacks.
Query-based attacks are typical black-box attacks, attackers
do not have the prior knowledge and get inner information
of DL models through hundreds of thousands of queries to
successfully generate an adversarial example [10].In [11],
thousands of queries are required for low-resolution images.
For high-resolution images, it still takes tens of thousands of
times. But attacking an image requires thousands of queries,
which is not operable in actual attacks of real-world cloud-
based image classification services.
In order to reduce the number of queries, [19] attack strategy
consists in training a local model to substitute for the target DL
models, using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary
and labeled by the target DL models. They have knowledge of
the training data and test the attack with the same distributed
data, and they upload the training data themselves and they
know the distribution of training data [19] [20] [21] .
Transfer learning attacks are first examined by [1], which
study the transferability between different models trained
over the same dataset. [12] propose novel ensemble-based
approaches to generate adversarial example . Their approaches
enable a large portion of targeted adversarial example to
transfer among multiple models for the first time.
Spatial transformation attacks are very interesting, [13]
evaluate the robustness of Google Cloud Vision API to input
perturbation, they show that adding an average of 14.25%
impulse noise is enough to deceive the API and when a noise
filter is applied on input images, the API generates mostly the
same outputs for restored images as for original images.
[14] report the first systematic study on the real-world
adversarial images and their use in online illicit promotions.
They categorize their techniques into 7 major categories,
such as color manipulation, rotation, noising and blurring.
[15] make the first attempt to conduct an extensive empirical
study of black-box attacks against real-world cloud-based
image detectors such as violence, politician and pornography
detection.
Our FFL-PGD attack based on Substitution model can be
classified as a combination of query-based attack and transfer
learning attack.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, (1) We propose a novel attack method, Fast
Featuremap Loss PGD (FFL-PGD) attack based on Substitu-
tion model, which achieves a high bypass rate with a very
limited number of queries. Instead of millions of queries in
previous studies, our method finds the adversarial examples
using only two queries per image; and (2) we make the first
attempt to conduct an extensive empirical study of black-box
attacks against real-world cloud-based classification services.
Through evaluations on four popular cloud platforms including
Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Clarifai, we demonstrate that
FFL-PGD attack has a success rate almost 90% among differ-
ent classification services. (3) We discuss the possible defenses
to address these security challenges in cloud-based classifica-
tion services. Our defense technology is mainly divided into
model training stage and image preprocessing stage. In the
future, we aim to explore the space of adversarial examples
with less perturbation in black-box and attempt to study target
attack using FFL-PGD attack. On the other hand, we will focus
on the defense in the cloud environment, so that AI services in
the cloud environment away from cybercrime. We hope cloud
service providers will not continue to forget this battlefield.
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